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FIRST DAY

SECTION ONE

VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS

Roanoke, Virginia - July 24, 1979

1. Although Tyrone Tyrant was a successful businessman in
Charlottesville, some people questioned the manner in which he
achieved his success. Among his other enterprises, he owned a
newspaper business, which he operated as a sole proprietorship.
In January 1978, he hired Sonny Slander as editor of the newspaper.
Nine months after he was hired as editor, Slander published
a novel which he had written. The protagonist of this novel was
a ruthless tycoon who rose to the top of the business world by
using unethical practices.
When he read this novel, Tyrant was incensed. Tyrant filed
an action at law for damages against Slander in the Circuit Court
for the City of Charlottesville in October, 1978. To his motion
for judgment, Tyrant attached as an exhibit a purported written
employment contract between Tyrant and Slander.
In the first count
of the motion for judgment Tyrant alleged that Slander breached
a provision of the contract which provided that Slander would take
no action which would subject Tyrant to public embarrassment.
By
the second count Tyrant alleged that readers of the novel would
identify Tyrant with the protagonist and thus assume that he,·
Tyrant, was equally ruthless and unethical. For this reason, according to the allegation, the publication of the book constituted
libel by Slander against Tyrant.
Slander filed a motion to require Tyrant to elect to proceed
on either (1) his contract count or (2) his tort count. The Court
ruled that there was no misjoinder of actions and that Tyrant could
proceed on both counts.
By his grounds of defense Slander alleged that he had never
signed the purported written contract and that actually what
appeared to be h.is signature thereon was a forgery.
In addition,
he alleged that his conduct in writing and publishing the novel
was protected by a provision of the purported contract stating that
Slander was permitted to publish such books, articles and essays
as he might desire dealing with such topics as he might desire.
At the trial, Tyrant contended that Slander should not be
permitted to present to the jury "the inconsistent and contradictory
contentions" that (1) his signature on the contract was a forgery
and (2) his conduct was protected by the terms of the contract.
The Court ruled that Slander could present evidence on only one of
these defenses and required him to elect one.

Section One

Page Two

(a) Did the Court rule correctly in permitting Tyrant to
proceed on both the contract count and the tort count?
(b) Did the Court rule correctly in prohibiting Slander
from presenting evidence with respect to both the purported forgery
and the defense based upon the terms of the written contract?
";~

* * * *

2. Arnie Gibson, a resident of the City of Charlottesville,
purchased a new automobile in December, 1978 ·.from Ralph's, Inc.
("Ralph's"), a Virginia corporation with its only place of business
and its registered office located in Newport News.
Several weeks
after .the purchase, Gibson was operating his automobile in the City
of Charlottesville. As he rounded a curve, he encountered in his
lane of travel an oncoming vehicle driven by Fred Lopez, a resident
of the City of Roanoke. Gibson veered to the right to avoid Lopez
and applied his brakes. The brakes failed to work, however, and
Gibson's vehicle left the right side of the road and struck a
tree. He sustained serious personal injuries and his automobile
was demolished.
Gibson subsequently instituted an action at law in the Circuit
Court of the City: of Roanoke against Lopez and Ralph's seeking to
recover damages for his accident. His motion alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Lopez and
the negligence of Ralph's. The motion also alleged that Ralph's
was liable for the accident because it had breached its warranties.
By his grounds of defense Lopez denied liability for the accident.
Ralph's filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue or in the
alternative to transfer the case to a permissible venue, asserting
that permissible venue existed only in the Circuit Court of the
City of Charlottesville where the cause of action alleging negligence arose or in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News
where the cause of action alleging breach of warranty arose and
where Ralph's conducts business and had its registered office and
where the goods which were the subject of the breach of warranty
action were delivered.
Before the Court ruled on Ralp~'s motion, Gibson took a nonsuit.
Gibson then instituted an action at law against Lopez and Ralph's
in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville based on identical allegations. Lopez and Ralph's filed separate motions to
dismiss on the ground that the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville was precluded from trying the case against them.
(a)
If Gibson had not taken a nonsuit, how should the Circuit
Court of the City of Roanoke have ruled on Ralph's motion to dismiss
or to transfer the case for improper venue?
(b) How should the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville
rule on the motions of Lopez and Ralph's to dismiss?

* * * * *
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3. Defendant was charged with burglary and grand larceny
in two separate indictments in the Circuit Court for the City of
Norfolk. Both charges arose out of a single set of alleged facts.
The Commonwealth elected to try Defendant on the grand larceny
charge first.
At the trial the Commonwealth presented evidence that,
shortly after midnight on the night of the crime, someone broke
the,lock on the back door of the occupied residence of Defendant's
next door neighbor, entered the residence, and removed from it
certain rare coins worth at least $10,000. The Conrrnonwealth's
evidence also showed that few people would have known the value
of the stolen coins but that Defendant possessed this knowledge;
that Defendant had long admired his neighbor's coin collection
and knew where it was stored; and that the thief also knew where
the coins were stored, since only the storage place of the coins
was disturbed during the crime. The Commonwealth also presented
evidence that the stolen coins were discovered in an unlocked
storage shed behind Defendant's house on the day after the crime.
Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge of grand larceny
and presented, as his sole defense, witnesses who testified that
he left Norfolk the day before the alleged theft to attend a weeklong convention of collectors of coins in Los Angeles.
The jury found Defendant innocent of grand larceny.
Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth brought Defendant to
trial on the charge of burglary. At the start of the second trial,
Defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the
double jeopardy provisions of the Virginia and United States Con?titutions barred the second prosecution. The Court overruled the
motion, to which action Defendant objected and excepted. The same
evidence was presented tothe jury in the second trial concerning
the alibi defense of Defendant. This time the jury found Defendant
guilty.
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Defendant (who had
by this time obtained a new lawyer), pressed the double jeopardy
point and for the first time urged that the prosecution for burglary
should have been barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
since the jury in the prosecution f~r grand larceny had accepted
his alibi defen~e.
·
(a)
defense?

How should the Supreme Court rule on the double jeopardy

(b) How should the Supreme Court rule on the collateral
estoppel defense?

>
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4. Break N. Enter was arrested in Bedford County on a
warrant charging that on December 1, 1978, in Bedford County he
(1) "did unlawfully and feloniously break and enter the property
of Vic Timm with the intent to commit larceny therein, and with
the use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of Section 18.2-91
of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended, and (2) did unlawfully
and feloniously rob Vic Timm by violence or putting him in fear
by threatening in violation of Section 18.2-58 of the 1950 Code
of Virginia, as amended."
·
During Enter' s preliminary hearing on December 4, 1978, _his
attorney made a plea bargain with the Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney who was conducting the case on behalf of the Commonwealth.
Thereafter the defense attorney and his client cooperated fully
with the Commonwealth. The agreement was that Enter would be
found guilty of the misdemeanor of assault and battery and given
twelve months in jail, with four months suspended. The other
charges would be dropped.
The Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney and the defense attorney
advised the Judge of the General District Court of Bedford County
of this agreement, and the Judge amended the warrant to read "that
on December 1, 1978, Enter did unlawfully assault and batter Vic
Timm . . . . " The Judge then noted on the face of the warrant that
on the basis of his guilty plea, the defendant had been found _
guilty of assauLt and battery and sentenced to serve twelve·months
in jail w~th four months suspended.
Following this disposition of the case, there was substantial
public outcry about the handling of the matter. Apparently in
response to that outcry, the Commonwealth's Attorney submitted to
the grand jury an indictment charging that Enter on December 1,
1978, did "unlawfully and feloniously break and enter in the nighttime the dwelling house of Vic Timm with intent to commit larceny
or other felony therein." Although Enter relied on his plea
bargaining agreement with the Commonwealth, the jury found him
guilty of burglary and sentenced him to ten years confinement in
the penitentiary.
Enter's attorney appealed this conviction to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. The only assignment of error involved the validity
of the plea bargaining defense whic~ he had properly asserted in
the trial court ..
How ought the Supreme Court of Virginia to decide the case?
(

~

";~

* * *

/

i~

5. .Due to your outstanding reputation in the field of
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure and your knowledge of the
Securities Exchange Act, Lawyer associates you in what he
anticipates will be complex federal securities lit-igation. His
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client,' Joe Anxious, a resident of the City of Richmond, purchased
certain corporate stock from Tom Easy, a resident of the City of
Charlottesville.
In connection with the sale Anxious gave Easy a
promissory note for $5,000 payable on demand .. Shortly after the
sale, Anxious obtained information which led him to believe that
he had been defrauded in the stock sale. You and Lawyer filed
for Anxious a complaint against Easy in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia at Charlottesville. The
complaint alleged violations of §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule lO(b)-5 promulgated thereunder, and Anxious
sought damages in the amount of $16,000 for the alleged fraud.
Easy answered the complaint by denying any fraud in the transaction
and he filed a counterclaim against Anxious for $5,000, based
upon the purchase money note.
·
You filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds
that (a) there was no diversity and a federal question was not
involved in the counterclaim and (b) the jurisdictional amount was
not involved.
How ought the Court to rule on each of the grounds stated in
the motion to dismiss the counterclaim?

6. On April 16, 1975, Ralph Seller and Frank Purchaser
entered into a written contract for the sale by Seller to Purchaser
of a tract of land located in Russell County, Virginia. On June
16, 1975, the date agreed upon to complete the transaction, Seller
refused to accept the purchase price or to execute a deed for the
property. On January 2, 1979, Purchaser filed a bill of complaint
in the Circuit Court of Russell County, in which he alleged the
existence of the contract, Seller's breach by the latter's refusal
to complete the transaction, and prayed that the Court decree
specific performance of the contract.
In due and proper time after service of process upon him,
Seller, through his counsel, attorney Young, filed his answer
denying that he was obligated to perform under the contract since
it involved real estate and was not .. under seal.
Seller also filed
a plea of the Statute of Limitations. Purchaser promptly filed
demurrers to Seller's answer and to his plea of the Statute of

Limita~:~(,~s ,:~ demurrer a proper pleading with which to
the

legal\s~fficiency

challenge

of the answer?

(b) Is the demurrer a proper pleading with which to challenge
the legal sufficiency of the Statute of Limitations?
(c)

What other pleading or pleadings, if any, are available

t.___; ·.
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to challenge the answer?

(d) What other pleading or pleadings, if any, are available
to challenge the plea of the Statute of Limitations?

* * * * *
7. John Giles and Thomas Bland were the owners of adjacent
lands in Craig County. Eland's land adjoined the highway and he
constructed a well-paved driveway from his home to the highway.
Giles' land was separated from the highway by a stream which ran
under the highway near the point where the two properties adjoined.
When Giles decided to construct his home in 1957, he sought
and obtained permission from Bland to use his driveway for the
purpose of transporting men and materials to his prospective home
site. After Giles' home had been completed, he continued to use
Eland's driveway as a means of access to the highway.
In November, 1978, Giles erected a concrete plant on the
back part of his property and began hauling his product in large,
heavily-loaded trucks-across Eland's driveway. This caused the
pavement on the driveway to break and become full of '_'potholes.','
On January 1, 19J9, Bland notified Giles in writing that any-.
further use by Giles would be treated as a trespass.
When Giles continued to use the driveway, Bland brought an
action at law in the Circuit Court of Craig County against Giles
for $10,000 for damages to the driveway caused by Giles' heavily
loaded trucks.
Giles immediately instituted a suit in equity
seeking to enjoin Eland's action at law on the grounds that he had
acquired a prescriptive right to use the driveway.
Bland demurred
to the bill of complaint on the ground that the court could not
properly enjoin his action at law.
How should the court rule on the demurrer?

8. John Webster, the owner of Sunnyside Farm in Campbell
County, mailed a letter to Jack Pike, a real estate broker in the
City of Lynchburg, Virginia, containing the following pertinent
language:
"I am thinking of selling my farm known
side Farm'. You have been recommended to me
a highly capable and industrious real estate
therefore, employ you to find a purchaser of
the price of $75,000."

as 'Sunnyas being
broker. ·I,
my farm at
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One week after receipt of Webster's letter, Pike mailed the
following letter to Webster:
"In accordance with your recent letter requesting
me to find a purchaser for 'Sunnyside Farm', I wish to
advise that I have sold your farm to Thomas Bane for
$75,000. A contract of sale duly signed by Mr. Bane is
enclosed herewith for your information.
I signed your
name to the~contract by me as your agent and I also
signed my name as agent for you. You will note that·
this contract is very simple and merely provides that
you agree to sell and Bane agrees to buy Sunnyside Farm
for $75,000, the sale to be consummated within a reasonable time from this date.'·'
·
On the day before receiving Pike's letter, Webster received
an offer of $85,000 for his property. Webster consults you, shows
you the two letters and inquires whether he is obligated to convey
his property to Bane.
What should you advise?

9. .·Roj ax Corporation is a Virginia corporation with principal
offices in James City County, doing business as a lumberyard
and supplier of millwork. During 1977 and 1978, one of its busiest
customers was Central Construction Co., a general contractor which
was aggressively striving to build up the volume of its business.
During 1978, Central secured a contract with James City County
for construction of a public elementary school, scheduled for completion in August of 1979. It also contracted with the proper
officials of the Eighth Baptist Church for the construction of a
new church building. The church was also scheduled for completion
in the summer of 1979. In addition, in January of 1979, Central
commenced construction of a commercial office building, which was
expected to be finished in six months. Rojax furnished lumber and
millwork for each of the three jobs.
Plagued by rising interest· cos.ts, delays caused by unusuq.lly.
heavy rains, and a shortage of masonry products, all three jobs
were losing money for Central.
In addition, the owners were having
their own troubles, and payments to Central were not made on time
or in full.
This caused Central to withhold payments from Rojax
for supplies furnished in February and March of 1979. Matters
grew worse until work on all three jobs was terminated prior to
completion. Work was stopped on the office building on April 10th,
on the school building on April 25th and on the church on May 23rd.
Negotiations among the parties were carried out during May
and June without success. Finally, on July 15th, Rojax became
convinced that further negotiation was useless and-consulted you,

•
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itjquiring whether it could then file a memorandum of mechanics
liert, and enforce the lien on each of the three jobs. How should
you advise Rojax as to (a) the office building, (b) the school,
and (c) the church?

* * * * *
10. Beth· and Bob Benson were married in Seattle, Washington
in 1974. Bob's earnings were less than he and Beth had expected
and ·ia great deal of tension developed between the two. They couldn't
afford to and didn't have any children and Beth was obliged to
take a job as a salesperson, which she grew to dislike heartily.
Eventually, their prospects seemed so dim to Beth that she moved
out of their home on August 20, 1977, and moved in with a girlfriend who lived in Spokane, Washington.
She never saw Bob after
she moved out of their home. On March 10, 1979, she moved to
Staunton, Virginia where she found employment, rented a small house,
and as she put it, settled down for the rest of her life. Shortly
thereafter she met a most attractive young man who proposed marriage
to her.
Beth contacted Bob Benson, who still lived in Seattle, advising him that she intended to file suit for divorce. He agreed to
accept service o-f process and agreed not to contest her suit· for
divorce if she would bear the expenses, seek no alimony, and make
no allegations of cruelty on his part. On July 15, 1979, she
advises you of the foregoing and inquires (a) whether she has grounds
for a divorce in Virginia; (b) if so, how soon may suit be commenced
and (c) may Bob Benson legally accept service of process? How would
you advise her as to e~ch question?

* * *

·k
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